National Security Letters, the FBI and Wiretapping
June 15, 2007
There has been a lot of hub bub this week over the FBI's use of National Security Letters and the Dept. of Justice's audit that was performed revealing that in over 1000 cases incorrect or additional information was collected.
A couple of points on this issue stood out in my mind:
1. The Audit concluded that in none of the cases did the agents intentionally over-collect info
2. Most of the extra information provided was done accidentally by the service provider / enterprise
3. This really had to do with static subscriber information not dynamic call information, which really means it had little to do with lawful intercept/wiretapping since addresses etc. are not provided as part of electronic surveillance
So if it wasn't intentional, how did the over-collection (providing) of information occur?
Now I don't have specifics on the actual use and implementation of the NSLs in these cases but if we look at the way CALEA based wiretapping is done and compare it to the use of the NSLs, you can draw some conclusions on what might have happened and why the over-collection occurred and why it doesn't occur for CALEA based wiretaps.
In CALEA based electronic surveillance, the fundamental concept is that the information is collected in real time as the communication session occurs. If that is to happen then specific target identifiers need to be articulated, the type of information to collect and directions on where to send the information need to be provided, otherwise the systems simply won't work. As long as those directions are followed then the system rules (not a person) within the Mediation/Delivery Functions control what information can be sent. In addition the protocols and standards (J-STD, PacketCable, ATIS etc.) only allow certain information, in specified parameters, with specified formats to be sent. And finally the collection function at law enforcement only accepts information that follows the prescribed formats and standards. Using this methodology, the information provided to law enforcement is very specific and well documented and significantly reduces the possibility of over-collection. Obviously over-collection could occur if someone put in the wrong end date etc. but in general the system has many checks and balances to ensure that CALEA based intercepts provide exactly what is permitted.
In contrast, the NSLs were more free form in their directions and use, and didn't have well established industry standards to fall back in the collection and delivery of information to law enforcement. It fell to the knowledge and capabilities the person receiving the NSL to determine what information was appropriate to send, how much to send and how to send it. Since it was determined that this was not intentionally done, clearly the problem was with the process and not the intention.
Till next time ...
A couple of points on this issue stood out in my mind:
1. The Audit concluded that in none of the cases did the agents intentionally over-collect info
2. Most of the extra information provided was done accidentally by the service provider / enterprise
3. This really had to do with static subscriber information not dynamic call information, which really means it had little to do with lawful intercept/wiretapping since addresses etc. are not provided as part of electronic surveillance
So if it wasn't intentional, how did the over-collection (providing) of information occur?
Now I don't have specifics on the actual use and implementation of the NSLs in these cases but if we look at the way CALEA based wiretapping is done and compare it to the use of the NSLs, you can draw some conclusions on what might have happened and why the over-collection occurred and why it doesn't occur for CALEA based wiretaps.
In CALEA based electronic surveillance, the fundamental concept is that the information is collected in real time as the communication session occurs. If that is to happen then specific target identifiers need to be articulated, the type of information to collect and directions on where to send the information need to be provided, otherwise the systems simply won't work. As long as those directions are followed then the system rules (not a person) within the Mediation/Delivery Functions control what information can be sent. In addition the protocols and standards (J-STD, PacketCable, ATIS etc.) only allow certain information, in specified parameters, with specified formats to be sent. And finally the collection function at law enforcement only accepts information that follows the prescribed formats and standards. Using this methodology, the information provided to law enforcement is very specific and well documented and significantly reduces the possibility of over-collection. Obviously over-collection could occur if someone put in the wrong end date etc. but in general the system has many checks and balances to ensure that CALEA based intercepts provide exactly what is permitted.
In contrast, the NSLs were more free form in their directions and use, and didn't have well established industry standards to fall back in the collection and delivery of information to law enforcement. It fell to the knowledge and capabilities the person receiving the NSL to determine what information was appropriate to send, how much to send and how to send it. Since it was determined that this was not intentionally done, clearly the problem was with the process and not the intention.
Till next time ...
Related Tags: calea based, information, collection, CALEA, calea, based
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RE: National Security Letters, the FBI and Wiretapping
Steve Bellovin :
July 12, 2007 11:42 AMNot at all clear this was benign -- news reports (i.e., http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07/exigentinvestigation) say that FBI agents may face criminal sanctions for abuse of NSLs.
RE: National Security Letters, the FBI and Wiretapping
Scott Coleman :
July 12, 2007 2:48 PM
Steve,
Thanks for the timely comment. If it turns out that there was mis-use or abuse then I certainly hope the appropriate due course of justice is served. I was really focusing on the differences between CALEA compliant intercepts and NSL intercepts.